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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JOHN \Y. CHIUSTENSEN,
Plaintiff-A ppclla nt,
vs.

LELIS AUTOMATIC TRA:NS:IIiSSION SERVICE, INC.,
Def end an t-R cspondc 11t.

Case No.
11847

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEl\IENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for misrepresentation which in1luced .Appellant to enter into a contract which respondent had no intentions to fulfill, and refused to fulfill,
:ind for breach of contract.
DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT
The complaint was dismissed in the lower court
motion of the respondent.

1111011
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant desires this Court to reverse and reman;
to the lower Court for trial.

STATEl\IENT OF FACTS

Respondent is a corporation dealing in the bus111e,,
of repairing and replacing automatic transmissi0th
automobiles. In connection with its business it adm
tises extensively in inter-state commerce (R. l), illten1l
ing the public to rely upon said advertisements IR.1
and to come to respondent for repairs and new tra111
1
missions. Appellant had read respondent's adverfoe.
ments and in reliance thereon, when his transmissio11
failed him, had his car towed by respondent to responJ
ent's place of business and transmission replaced (R J,
pursuant to the price schedule set out in part 4 of fa
hibit "A" attached to the complaint (R. 6). Thereafter
respondent replaced another part of the differential ana
the torque converter (R. 3) and charged appellant
$384.77, including costs of towing, plus a time differ·
ential of $45.31, making a total of $430.18 (R. 8). Ai
pellant requested a guarantee as represented in the aJ
vertisement at the time of taking delivery of his car allO
was then informed for the first time that he had tbt
highest coverage given which was a 12,000 mile guarati
tee plus a 12,000 mile warranty (R. 3 and 9), rathei
than the advertised 100'/r labor and 100%1 parts.
11
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1

Appellant took his car and before 12,000 miles had
been difrer, the transmission broke down and appellant
returned his car to respondent who refused to honor the
contract and repair the transmission at respondent's
expense (R. 4) ·
,\ppellant lost employment and filed this suit for
damages.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. PUBLIC OPINION DEMANDS
HONESTY IN ADVERTISING.
For several years there has been great agitation in
the United States about having truth in advertising.
One of the great social movements of our time is to require honesty in all forms of labelling and all forms of
advertising. It has become such a social problem that
the Federal Government is moving into the field and
the Federal Trade Commission has been bringing actions against various companies for unfair and deceptive
advertising. Most of these cases are settled before the
Federal Trade Commission.
In the Salt Lake Tribune of December 2, 1969
there was a newspaper report typifying the action the
Federal Government is taking. A copy of the newspaper clipping is set out below:
"The Federal Trade Commission accused the
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. Monday of unfair
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and deceptive advertising when it offered i·
Ith
.
h
at re d uce d prices but sold t em at higher prict,
. '.'The
that the .Firestone ail, '
off
tires
s1gmficant reductions from act
ll:al prices. But m some cases, the commission sa 11i
tires were sold at prices substantially aboYe tn: ·
advertised price.
'
"The commission said it found reason to lit· .
lieve federal law had been violated an<l that
would issue a formal complaint under procedure1 .
which allow a company to settle such allegati11 n,
in a consent order."
:
1

It is incumbent upon each citizen of the Uniteu
States when he feels that companies are advertisingdt·
ceptively, unfairly and untruthfully to take a stand 01,
the matter. In this case the appellant has done so.

i

In the opinion of counsel this is a growing field ana
the Courts must look not only to the wording of the !:111.
but to the necessity of creating honesty and fair deallli:
between sellers and buyers. The days of caveat emptor
should be, if they are not already, permanently gone.

POINT II. NE\VSP APER ADYERTISE·
MENTS CONSTITUTE A CONTINUING Of
FER IN INTERSTATE COM.MERCE TO ALL•
MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC \iVHO READ
THEM.
Restatement Contracts P. 28 says:
"An offer may be made to a specifiedpersonni
· may be m11lr
persons or class of persons, or 1t
'
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to anyone or everyone to whom it becomes
known. The person or persons in whom is created
a power of acceptance are to be determined hy
the reasonable interpretation of the offer."
17 Am . .J ur. 2nd 372 states:

''P. 34. TO \V"HOM OFFER MAY BE MADE;
OFFER BY NE\VSP APER; CIRCULAR, OR
ADVERTISEMENT.
"An offer need not be addressed to a particular individual in order to constitute a proposal
which may be converted into a contract Ly acceptance. A binding obligation may even originate in adntrisements addressed to the general
public. A positive off er may be made by an advertisement or general notice in a newspaper or
circular.
"The question whether an advertisement in a
newspaper or circular letter constitutes an offer
is dependent upon the language of the particular
advertisement or circular, the intention of the
parties, and the circumstances. Accordingly, 111
a number of particular cases an advertisement in
a newspaper would constitute a contract, while in
other instances the contrary result was reached.
A study of the cases shows a tendency to regard a
newspaper advertisement or circular letter as an
invitation to make an offer, rather than an offer
the acceptance of which would consumate a contract, unless a contrary intent was indicated by
the advertisement or letter itself. The test of
1rhether a binding obligation may originate in
advertisements addressed to the general public is
said to be whether the facts show that some performance was promised in positive terms in re-
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turn for something promised. The view has !Je
taken that in order for an advertisement or c;,
cular letter to constitute an offer rather than·' i
invitation to negotiate, it should set forth
terms on which the contract is to be based." '
!

I

In the instant case the off er in the advertiseme 1
was clear and unambiguous, i.e. "Free towing",

I

POINT Ill. THE OFFER \VAS ACCEPT
ED AND A BINDING CONTRACT AROSE·
\VHEN PLAINTIFF CALLED DEFENDAXT
TO TO"\V IN PLAINTIFF'S CAR AND RE
PLACE THE TRANSMISSION.

1

No more unequivocal acceptance of the offer cau !Jt ;
imagined than appellant acting in pursuance thereol
and having his car towed in and ordering the transmi\·
sion replaced in accordance with the printed advertise· •
men ts.
In the case of Willis vs. Allied Insulation Co. 171
So. 2nd 858, the Louisiana Supreme Court said at page
861:

"In the Court's opinion, there is no questiu11
that the defendant was obligated to pay the.
plaintiff at least $450.00 per month for the.two
months provided he was not dismissed for failure
to work. When the plaintiff answered the ao·
vertisement and was accepted for the joh therr
was in full force and effect a binding employ·
ment contract. A newspaper advertisement mai
. h \\rill. con·.
constitute an offer, acceptance of whic
. t Ill
summate a contract and create an obl 1ga wn
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offeror to perform according to terms of publisher offer." .Johnson v. Capital City Ford Company, Inc. (LaApp.) 85 So. 2d 75.
''Here the employer cast the lure of future employment to prospective employees by means of
a newspaper advertisement. 'It must further be
remembered that the words of the advertisement
were of course chosen by defendant-dealer, and
if any ambiguity exists as to their meaning, it
must be resolved against their composer.' Johnson v. Capital City Ford Company, Inc., (LaApp.) 85 So. 2d 7 5."

In the instant case the words in the advertisements
were chosen by the respondent and any ambiguity must
be resolved against respondent.
In .T ohnson v. Capital City .Ford Company, 85
So. 2nd 75 at 79 the court said:

"In Louisiana and elsewhere a newspaper advertisement may constitute an offer, the acceptance of which will consummate a contract and
create an obligation in the offeror to perform according to the terms of the published off er; cases
cited"

In Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store,
8G N.W. 2nd 689 , where there was an offer in an ad\'ertisement and the store refused to perform, the store
\\'as held liable for damages and the court said:
"\Vhere offer is clear, definite and explicit
and leaves nothing open for negotiation, it constitutes an off er, acceptance of which will complete the contract."
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This point is so elementary that counsel for ap ti·
lant hesitates to labor it further but refers the honur:blt
Court to Williston, Contracts 3rd Ed. 32; Bull v. Tai.
cott, 2 Root (Conn.) 119; Baxter v. Camp, 71 Couii.
245, 41 A. 803; Vico Ari. Soc. v. Hrumfiel, 112 lnll. i
146, 1 N .E. 382; Anderson v. St. Louis Public Scho11 J,
122 Mo. 61, 27 S.W. 610; .McLaurin v. Hamer, ltii;
S.C. 411, 164 S.E. 2; Oliver v. Henley (Tex) n
S.W. 2nd 576.
See also 157 A.L.R. 744 which has an annotatimi
covering points Hand Ill
POINT IV. A VALID EXISTING cox.
TRACT MAY NOT BE MODIFIED WITH I
OUT CONSIDERATION.
17 C.J .S. 428 states:
"A modification of a contract being a ne11
contract . . . , a consideration is necessary to sup·
port the new agreement."
12 Am. J ur. 986 states it more fully:
"While there are some expressions in the cast>
which seem to dispense with the necessity of co11·
sideration for a modification of a contract, a
modification can be nothing but a new
and must be supported by a consideration hkt
every other contract, unless it can be supporteil
on principles of estoppel or waiver. Both P3.'.
ties must receive consideration. 'Vhere a wrn
ten contract is either totally abandoned and an·
?ulled or
altered or
in
its terms, this is done only by a d1strnct and·
8

stantiYe rnntract between the parties, founded
011 some ndid consideration."
In Bamberger Co. v. Certified Productions, 48 P.
.J;89 at 491, 88 Utah 194, this court stated:
"Parties may orally modify an agreement in
writing where the original contract is not required by the Statute of Frauds to be in writing, at
least where there is con.Yideration for such modification." (Emphasis added)
In the instant case the contract was complete upou
the ordering of the work to be done and no consideration passed thereat' ter for modification of the contract.
CONCLUSION
In the instant case a valid, existing contract was
entered into between the appellant and respondent at
the moment appellant answered respondent's advertisement and had his car towed to respondent's place of
business for the purpose of repairing and/or installing
a new transmission. No agreement of modification of
tl1e contract for towing and installation was ever thereafter made and respondent was obligated to perform-in
accordance with the terms of its advertised offer. By
virtue of its failure so to do it should be held liable for
all damages naturally flowing from its wilfull breach
of contract.
Respectfully submitted,

J. LAMBERT GIBSON
Attorney for Appellant
17 4 East 8th South
Salt Lake City, Utah
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